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This paper examines the pricing of global syndicated loans during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
We find that loan spreads rise by over 11 basis points in response to a one standard deviation 
increase the lender’s exposure to COVID-19 and over 5 basis points for an equivalent increase 
in the borrower’s exposure. This renders firms subject to a burden of about USD 5.16 million 
and USD 2.37 million respectively in additional interest expense for a loan of average size and 
duration. The aggravating effect of the pandemic is exacerbated with the level of government 
restrictions to tackle the virus’s spread, with firms’ financial constraints and reliance on debt 
financing, whereas it is mitigated for relationship borrowers, borrowers listed in multiple 
exchanges or headquartered in countries that can attract institutional investors. 
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The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the disease it causes 
(COVID-19) was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China. It quickly spread across 
the globe evolving into a health pandemic and causing severe disruptions in economic activity. 
In an attempt to contain this spread, several countries adopted severe restrictions on their 
populations, accompanied by several measures on the fiscal and monetary policy front in order 
to prevent mass unemployment and business failures.1 As the ongoing pandemic interrupts 
firms’ revenue streams for an indeterminate period, firms face fixed costs and debt service 
expenses along with declining cash balances. The deteriorating quality balance sheets makes it 
difficult for firms that are in dire need for cash, to obtain credit as banks are reluctant to lend to 
borrowers with poor credit quality and low asset values. While most firms respond to the 
increasing uncertainty by hoarding cash, they still seek credit as their cash balances decline. 
Given that, a natural question concerns the effect of the pandemic on the terms of bank lending. 
In specific, how the pricing of loans responds to the lenders’ and borrowers’ growing exposure 
to COVID-19? This paper seeks to answer this question by focusing on large corporate loan 
deals made in syndicated loan markets around the world. 
Bank lending during economic downturns has been a subject of intense scrutiny, with 
conventional wisdom at least since Bernanke (1983) suggesting that financial crises disrupt the 
credit allocation process, thereby leading to restricted credit supply and higher borrowing costs. 
These conclusions are further confirmed when considering the impact of the U.S. credit crunch 
and the consequent 2008-09 financial crisis: higher loan spreads driven by large bank losses 
during the crisis, with this interest rate premium mainly applied to borrowers that were more 
likely dependent on bank credit (see, e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Santos, 2011; Kahle 
and Stulz, 2013).  
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The COVID-19 crisis bears some similarities to the 2008-09 crisis since both put a 
severe strain on global economies (through widespread bankruptcies, liquidity shortages, large 
losses, etc.), but unlike the former, where banks themselves suffered from losses, the latter 
constitutes an aggregate demand and supply shock for both lenders and borrowers. However, 
the 2008-09 crisis was a primarily endogenous process, as the events leading to the crisis were 
caused by the interaction of market participants and the weakness of the financial system. On 
the other hand, the ongoing COVID-19 crisis represents a purely exogenous shock to the global 
financial system and as such, its implications for the demand and supply of bank credit cannot 
be investigated only through the lens of endogenous risk. 
In this study, we empirically investigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the 
pricing of more than 4,000 syndicated loans granted from 77 lead lenders to 820 borrowers. We 
do so, by considering measures of the lenders’ and borrowers’ exposures to COVID-19 and 
quantifying their effect on all-in spread drawn (AISD), which is the primary price measure in 
the syndicated loan market. We concentrate on the 2019-2020 period, effectively contrasting 
the year of the global pandemic with the year before. To measure each of the loan counterparty’s 
exposure to COVID-19, we employ a text-based measure from Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, 
and Tahoun (2020). This measure reflects the risks to each company associated with the spread 
of the COVID-19 based on the word combinations referring to COVID-19 in the transcripts of 
the quarterly conference calls held by the company (adjusted for differences in transcript 
length).2 
 Importantly, we differentiate between the exposure of the lending bank and the 
exposure of the borrowing firm in order to distinguish supply-side risk from demand-side. The 
lender’s exposure reflects the overall credit risk that the bank is exposed to arising from the 
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 This process for the calculation of each company’s exposure is further described in Section 3; a detailed analysis 
is included Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2020). 
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bank’s total lending operations and the bank’s overall funding constraints. As such, it is an 
indication of the bank’s ability to fund the loan and the bank’s risk aversion that shape bank 
loan supply. On the other hand, the borrower’s exposure reflects demand-side forces, stemming 
from the firm-specific credit risk and the firm’s ability to repay the loan. If supply-side forces 
exert a different impact – if any – relative to demand-side forces during the COVID-19 crisis, 
we expect an asymmetry in the response of loan spreads to each of the lender’s and borrower’s 
exposure measures.  
Our baseline specification shows that a one standard deviation increase in our lender’s 
exposure measure raises loan spreads by more than 11 basis points. Economically, this is a large 
effect, equal to a 6.6% higher AISD compared to the average in our sample. For a loan of 
average size and duration, this translates into USD 5.16 million of additional interest expenses 
for the borrowing firm. The equivalent response attributed to the same increase in our 
borrower’s exposure measure is less potent, amounting to approximately 5 basis points or a 3% 
increase for the average AISD. The additional interest burden over the duration of the average 
loan is consequently about USD 2.37 million. 
Several sensitivity tests show that these baseline findings are robust. The most important 
of these tests are the following four. First, we use different sets of fixed effects (see, e.g., Delis, 
Hasan, and Ongena, 2020) to control for alternative bank- and firm-side explanations of our 
findings and the macroeconomic environment in the lender’s and borrower’s countries. Second, 
we use specifications with different loan control variables to show that the results are not driven 
by a “bad controls problem.” Third, we run a seemingly unrelated regression to account for the 
simultaneous determination for the simultaneous setting of the price and non-price loan terms 
at loan origination. Fourth, the results are robust when using a Heckman-type model, to account 
for selection issues between lenders and borrowers (see Dass and Massa, 2011). 
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Consequently, we examine the differential role of the various containment and closure 
policies adopted at the national government level to contain the spread of the coronavirus. In 
the presence of high restrictions where economic activity crashes and uncertainty soars, we 
would expect banks to lower credit supply and firms to increase their demand for credit; all this 
should lead to a rise in loan spreads. We show that this is indeed the case, as greater stringency 
is associated with higher loan spreads, confirming the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic to economic activity. 
In addition to the government containment policies, monetary policy authorities further 
embarked on new efforts (by decreasing interest rates and purchasing public and private sector 
securities) to lower borrowing costs and increase lending. We find that the adjustment of the 
repo rate is only able to affect the cost of loans for a given level of borrower’s rather than 
lender’s exposure to COVID-19. Similarly, the conduct of open market purchases in the 
borrower’s country eases the pressures on loan spreads stemming from the COVID-19 exposure 
of that country’s firms. 
Our examination also concerns whether firm financial constraints exacerbate the 
aggravating effect of COVID-19 exposure on loan spreads. Firms that are financially 
constrained effectively face an inelastic supply of external capital, which is further reinforced 
during turbulent periods: raising external capital quickly becomes ever more expensive, 
reflecting a steep supply curve (see Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). We find that financially 
constrained firms face higher borrowing costs relative to non-constrained; furthermore 
borrowing costs rise with the firm’s default risk. Hence, we reveal that the declining quality of 
the firms’ balance sheets is a contributing factor to their increasing borrowing costs.  
We further enhance our identification approach for supply-side and demand-side effects 
of lenders’ and borrowers’ COVID-19 exposure by looking into bank and firm heterogeneity 
with respect to financial health and performance. We thus hypothesize that the aggravating 
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effect of lender’s exposure should be more potent for larger and well capitalized banks, as these 
usually charge higher spreads (see Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2014; Dell’Ariccia, 
Laeven, and Suarez, 2017). We examine this hypothesis using models with interaction terms 
between our lender’s exposure measure with bank measures of size and capital adequacy and 
we find that this is indeed the case. Besides highlighting relevant heterogeneity in the results, 
these models further enhance our identification of a supply-side mechanism driving our findings 
(e.g., Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina, 2014). On the same line, we interact relevant firm 
indicators with our borrower’s exposure measure and we find that loans are less expensive for 
larger firms that rely more on equity financing and are listed on multiple stock exchanges. 
We also find that institutional quality acts as a counterforce to the exacerbating effects 
of the pandemic. Firms headquartered in countries with a strong institutional environment that 
can attract institutional investors receive lower spreads for a given level of lender’s and 
borrower’s exposure to COVID-19. Even for exposed firms we identify two strategies that help 
mitigate the adverse effect of the pandemic on their borrowing costs. The first concerns the 
formation of strong bank-firm relationships, which reduces the upward pressure on loan spreads 
stemming from the bank’s exposure. From a similar perspective, borrowing from a bank’s 
subsidiary further minimizes information asymmetry due to the firm’s exposure. 
We finally document the implications for the syndicate structure, as usually the retention 
of larger share by the lead lender provides a positive signal to the syndicate members (see Sufi, 
2007; Ivashina, 2009). However, in response to growing lender’s exposure to COVID-19, the 
formation of a wider and less concentrated syndicate comes at the expense of higher spreads, 
as syndicate members require an additional compensation to partner with the exposed lead bank.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
theoretical background. Section 3 presents the data set and the empirical specification. Section 
4 presents and discusses the main empirical results, showing the impact of lenders’ and 
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borrowers’ exposure to COVID-19 on the cost of credit. Section 5 identifies the mechanisms 
through which this exposure materializes into higher loan spreads. Section 6 examines the role 
of the syndicate’s structure. Section 7 concludes the paper. An Internet Appendix provides 
several additional summary statistics and robustness checks. 
 
2. Related Literature and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Related literature and contribution  
Our work relates to several strands of the literature. We complement the studies on the 
implications of financial crises on bank lending behavior. Typically, during crises there is a 
drop in the supply of bank credit. This drop can stem from shocks to borrowers’ collateral, 
which affect firms’ ability to raise capital if agency and information problems are significant 
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), or it can stem from shocks to bank capital, which affect the 
supply of bank loans if agency and information problems limit the ability of banks to raise 
additional capital (see Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian, 
2011; Santos, 2011; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). Our study provides the first empirical investigation 
of the impact of this exogenous coronavirus shock on the pricing of bank loans. Our main 
differentiation, at least compared to the examination of the global financial crisis, is the channel 
through which the current pandemic affects bank loan prices; we show that the deteriorating 
balance sheets of the borrowing firms is the major contributing factor to increasing loan spreads. 
Our work further relates to recent studies the impact of COVID-19 on firm financing 
choices and borrowing costs.  During the coronavirus pandemic, firms heavily resorted to the 
use of lines of credit, by either arranging for new credit lines or drawing down on existing ones 
(see Acharya and Steffan, 2020; Li, Li, Macchiavelli, and Zhou 2020). Moreover, the COVID-
19 crisis exerted an adverse effect on the stock returns of firms with high levels of leverage or 
limited cash (see Albuquerque, Koskinen, Yang, and Zhang, 2020; Ding, Levine, Lin, and Xie, 
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202; Fahlenbrach, Rageth, and Stulz, 2020). We complement these findings by documenting 
that firms generally face higher borrowing costs during the COVID-19 crisis, which are 
aggravated by firm financial constraints and reliance on debt financing. We also highlight the 
easing effect of bank-firm lending relationships and the institutional attractiveness of the 
borrower’s country. 
Finally, our work concerns the impact of central bank open market operations on bank 
lending. The effects of asset purchase programmes on asset prices are well documented, with 
evidence suggesting leading to improved liquidity conditions and reduced default-risk premia; 
this is the case for interventions by the Federal Reserve during the U.S. credit crunch and the 
global financial crisis (see, e.g., Carpenter, Demiralp, Ihrig, and Klee, 2015; Neely, 2015) and 
by the European Central Bank during the European sovereign debt crisis (see, e.g., Eser and 
Schwaab, 2016; Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2018; Koetter, 2019). 
Moreover, as entering the COVID-19 crisis, corporate bond purchases by the Fed are also found 
to ease funding constraints for borrowing firms and improve financial stability (see Flanagan 
and Purnanandam, 2020). We provide evidence that (downward) adjustments to the repo rate 
and open market purchases in the borrower’s country are a sufficient tool for easing the 
aggravating effect stemming from the borrower’s exposure to COVID-19. On the other hand, 
operations in the lender’s country are not able to contain the effect from the lender’s exposure. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses development 
Our basic premise is that the COVID-19 crisis exerts a negative supply- and demand-side effect 
on bank loan spreads. Crises and the consequent uncertainty shocks drastically change bank 
lending behavior as banks engage in precautionary liquidity hoarding and rebalance their 
portfolios toward safer assets; eventually available capital in financial markets dries up, leading 
to a restriction in credit supply and higher lending rates (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
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2008; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). These tight lending conditions are 
further reinforced by the transmission of shocks to bank capital both domestically and 
internationally, exacerbating bank capital constraints and the reduction in overall supply of 
bank credit  (see Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 
2011). 
However, the current pandemic also constitutes an unexpected demand shock. By 
dramatically decreasing revenues for most firms, prevents them from meeting their fixed 
expenses and service their current debt obligations. Although some firms respond by reducing 
capital expenditures and resorting to own funds, they still face the need to supplement internal 
funding with debt financing and rollover existing debt (Fahlenbrach, Rageth, and Stulz, 2020).  
However, early evidence from the ongoing pandemic documents deteriorating liquidity 
conditions in the corporate bond market that limits the ability of firms to raise debt (see Kargar, 
Lester, Lindsay, Liu, Weill, and Zúñiga, 2020).  
 In light of the above mechanisms, we expect that the negative credit supply shock 
stemming from the COVID-19 crisis is accompanied by an increase in the firm demand for 
credit, thereby leading to a higher cost of loans. This forms our first hypothesis (H1): 
 
H1: Greater exposure to COVID-19 increases the spread on the loans granted 
(received) by the lender (borrower). 
 
We further expect central bank interventions to ease the pressure on loan spreads. 
Financial crises typically result in a drop in the value of assets in bank portfolios, thereby 
lowering their use as top-quality collateral in repurchase (“repo”) agreements. As banks rely on 
repo agreements for short-term funding, any disruptions in the repo market (such as haircuts or 
withdrawal of agreements) prevents banks from rolling over their short-term borrowing (see 
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Martin, Skeie, and Thadden, 2014). Banks respond by cutting back on lending and/or charging 
higher interest rates; this was a typical feature of the U.S. credit crunch (see Brunnermeier, 
2009; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). 
However, the drop in asset values has further implications for firms, as they find it harder to 
obtain financing at competitive rates by pledging their assets as collateral (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2001; Gorton and Ordonez, 2014).  
Through the conduct of reverse repo operations and asset purchases in the secondary 
market central banks adjust the quantity and consequently the price and liquidity of securities 
available; this further changes the value of assets in bank and firm portfolios. In fact, recent 
evidence from the COVID-19 crisis reveals the effectiveness of the Fed’s liquidity provision in 
stabilize conditions in short-term funding markets (see Li, Li, Macchiavelli, and Zhou, 2020), 
while its corporate bond purchases appear to have eased borrowers’ funding constraints and 
improved financial stability (see Flanagan and Purnanandam, 2020). On the same line, the 
European Central Bank’s interventions have ensured the smooth operation of the Euro Area 
repo market (Billio, Costola, Mazzari, and Pelizzon, 2020). 
Given the scale of central banks’ response to the coronavirus crisis, we expect that 
central bank operations (in the form of adjustments to the repo rate and asset purchases) ease 
the aggravating effect of COVID-19 on the cost of bank loans. This in turn gives rise to our 
second hypothesis (H2): 
 
H2: Central bank operations contain – if not reverse – the increase in loan spreads. 
 
The ongoing pandemic has significantly stressed firm balance sheets by lowering the 
value of firm assets and consequently the value of collateral that firms can borrow against; a 
comparable decline in the value of firm equity translates to higher leverage, causing firms to 
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face higher financing costs (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013; 
Kahle and Stulz, 2013). Moreover, the disruption in economic activity during the COVID-19 
crisis and the resulting negative shock to aggregate demand, causes firms to further face 
liquidity shortages and the inability to cover operating expenses and costs of existing debt. 
Therefore, the deteriorating balance sheets of firms will be an opposing factor to the firms’ 
quest for obtaining financing at competitive interest rates. 
Given this, we conjecture that lenders will respond by accommodating the needs of 
financial constrained borrowers, nevertheless this will be at the expense of higher loan spreads. 
In other words, we expect the COVID-19 crisis to exert a balance sheet multiplier effect on firm 
borrowing costs. This leads us to form our third hypothesis (H3): 
 
H3: The increase in loan spreads is stronger for financially constraint borrowers 
relative to non-financially constrained borrowers. 
 
We further expect the upward adjustment of loan spreads (in response to increasing 
lender’s exposure) to be contingent on the characteristics of the lending bank. Large banks have 
introduced more structured and formal systems for loan approval, portfolio monitoring, capital 
adequacy analysis as well as profitability and loan pricing analysis (Treacy and Carey, 2000). 
Rising uncertainty, such as that during the coronavirus crisis, causes banks to engage in more 
heavy and costly monitoring to reduce credit risk in their loan portfolios. As a result, they can 
either reject the allocation of new loans or pass on costs to borrowers in the form of higher 
interest rates. Large and well capitalized banks often solve this risk-shifting problem by 
charging higher spreads (see Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2014; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, 
and Suarez, 2017). 
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If this is a credible mechanism for setting loan spreads, we expect that the aggravating 
effect of lender’s exposure is magnified for loans granted by large and well capitalized lenders. 
This leads to our fourth hypothesis (Hypothesis 4): 
 
H4: The aggravating effect of COVID-19 exposure on loan spreads is magnified for 
larger and better capitalized lenders than smaller and less capitalized lenders. 
 
Although we expect banks to adjust loan spreads upward following a rise in the 
borrower’s COVID-19 exposure, this response should be contingent on the nature and type of 
their borrowing counterparty. In this respect, the adjustment should be less sizable ‒ or even 
reversed ‒ for large borrowers with unrestricted access to alternative funding sources. Large 
firms have different structural characteristics and corporate governance schemes that lead them 
to react differently to the same economic shocks relative to smaller firms (Chan and Chen, 
1991). In addition, large and sophisticated borrowers might operate more efficient credit risk 
departments that monitor the firm’s credit risk exposure. 
Large firms are further often listed on multiple stock exchanges. A foreign listing gives 
the firm the incentive to provide higher quality financial information and places the company 
under scrutiny from reputable intermediaries (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Shi, Magnan, 
and Kim, 2012). The resulting higher disclosure standards combined with the dual pressures 
from both foreign and domestic stock exchanges makes cross-listed firms more adept at 
attracting alternative sources of financing (see Hillman and Wan, 2005). All this, renders them 
less susceptible to adverse economic developments relative to single-listed borrowers. 
Prior lending relationships between the lead bank and the borrowing firm further emerge 
as an additional mechanism for minimizing the uncertainty regarding the firm’s ability to repay 
the loan. Typically, these relationships convey information to banks that firms cannot credibly 
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communicate to the capital markets (Kang and Stulz, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan, 2009). As such, firms can capitalize on such relationships in bad times and 
strengthen their bargaining power during the loan negotiation process (Bolton, Freixas, 
Gambacorta, Mistrulli, 2016). 
In the presence of the above mechanisms, we will observe a reversal in the sign of the 
borrower’s COVID-19 exposure for loans to large and continuous borrowers listed on multiple 
stock exchanges. This leads to our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 5) as follows: 
 
H5: The aggravating effect of the borrower’s COVID-19 exposure is contained for 
larger and cross-listed borrowers with a previous lender relationship than smaller and first-
time borrowers listed only domestically. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
We obtain data from multiple sources. We collect data on syndicated loan facilities (the unit of 
our analysis) from DealScan, which includes the most comprehensive and historical loan-deal 
information available on the global syndicated loan market. We focus on the period from 1 
January 2019 to 31 July 2020, contrasting the year of the global pandemic with the year before. 
We drop all loans for which there is no conventional pricing (i.e., there is no spread) and this 
removes all types of Islamic finance and very specialized credit lines. We match the loan 
facilities with bank-level and firm-level COVID-19 exposure measures from Hassan, 
Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2020). In a last round of data collection we obtain bank- and 
firm-specific characteristics from Compustat, and additional macroeconomic and institutional 
(country-year) variables from several freely available sources. The number of loan facilities for 
our baseline specifications ranges from 2,979 to 4,117 depending on the controls and the set of 
fixed effects used. These 4,117 loans were granted by 77 lead lenders headquartered in 11 
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countries to 820 borrowers from 28 countries.3 We provide variable definitions and sources in 
Table A1 of the Internet Appendix and basic summary statistics in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.1. Empirical model and key variables 
The baseline form of our empirical model is: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷 − 19 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑡 +                                      +𝑎2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷 ̵19 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡 .                       (1) 
 
The outcome variable Cost of credit is the all-in spread drawn (AISD) of loan facility l 
originated at time t. This is the most widely used measure, denoting the spread over LIBOR, 
although a strand of the literature (e.g., Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz, 2016) also 
highlights the importance of fees and the all-in spread undrawn (AISU). The vector 𝑎0 denotes 
different types of fixed effects, described later. Controls is a vector of control variables of 
dimension 𝑘, and 𝑢 is a stochastic disturbance. 
Bank (Firm) COVID-19 exposure is the lender’s (borrower’s) exposure to COVID-19 
from Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2020) based on the counting of word 
combinations referring to COVID-19 in quarterly earnings conference calls held by publicly 
listed companies. The company’s exposure is calculated by parsing the available earnings call 
transcripts and counting the number of times the synonyms associated with COVID-19 are used. 
Consequently, this number is divided by the total number of words in the transcript to account 
for differences in transcript length. 
                                                 
3
 Consistent with relevant studies on the syndicated loan market we only include information on lead lenders (see, 
e.g., Santos and Winton, 2019; Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020). 
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The main coefficients of interest in Equation (1) are 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, which indicate the effect 
of lender’s and borrower’s exposure to COVID-19 respectively on the cost of credit. We expect 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 to be positive if greater exposure to COVID-19 increases the lender’s and borrower’s 
default risk thus increasing the spread on syndicated loans. The lender’s exposure reflects the 
overall credit risk that the bank is exposed to arising from the bank’s total lending operations 
as well as the bank’s funding constraints. It is therefore an indication of how the coronavirus 
crisis affects the bank’s ability to fund the loan and the bank’s risk aversion that shape loan 
supply. On the other hand, the borrower’s exposure refers to the firm-specific credit risk and 
the firm’s ability to repay the loan. As such, we expect the lender’s exposure to exert a stronger 
impact relative to the borrower’s, if supply-side forces matter more for the determination of 
loan spreads relative to demand-side forces during the COVID-19 crisis. Reversely, the 
dominance of demand-side forces over supply-side forces will be reflected in the stronger 
impact of the borrower’s exposure compared to the lender’s. 
 
3.2. Identification, controls, and fixed effects. 
A key aim of our empirical analysis is to identify the causal effect of COVID-19 on the Cost of 
credit. We are less concerned with simultaneity and reverse causality because a firm’s exposure 
to the pandemic is determined before lenders make new loans. In our setting, the key problem 
is omitted-variable bias, especially when considering both loan counterparties’ exposure to 
COVID-19. 
Consistent with related studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Delis, Hasan, and 
Ongena, 2020), we control for the logarithm of the loan amount, the logarithm of loan maturity, 
the number of lenders in the syndicate, binary indicators for collateral and performance-pricing 
provisions, and the total number of covenants. We also conduct sensitivity tests without loan 
control variables to confirm that our model is not subject to a “bad controls” problem. We 
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further control for bank characteristics, such as bank size (Bank size), bank return on assets 
(Bank ROA), and bank capital (Bank capital); likewise, our set of firm-level controls includes 
firm size (Firm size), firm return on assets (Firm ROA), and firm leverage (Firm leverage). 
Following the relevant studies (e.g., Ivashina, 2009; Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch, 
2019), we include the lags of our bank and firm controls. We further include country-pair-year 
level variables, such as the difference in the GDP growth rate between the lender’s country and 
the borrower’s country (GDP growth), and their difference in GDP per capita (GDP per capita) 
to account for differences in the economic development and the macroeconomic environment 
between each country-pair.4 We provide the exact definitions of these variables in Table A1 
and summary statistics in Table 1. 
To maintain a high level of variation in Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 
exposure, we initially consider a specification with a very simple set of fixed effects – namely, 
year-, bank-, and lender’s country-level effects – allowing us to estimate the coefficients on our 
COVID-19 exposure measures for the largest sample of banks and firms in our sample. These 
effects complement our bank-level characteristics and allow us to control for general bank-side 
explanations of our findings (such as differences in banks’ financial soundness and corporate 
governance). They further control for differences in the macroeconomic environment of the 
lenders’, thereby saturating the effect of our COVID-19 exposure measures on AISD from any 
                                                 
4
 We identify the lender’s and the borrower’s country as the one in which the lender and the borrower respectively 
is located. In the event where a loan is provided by the parent bank’s foreign affiliate or subsidiary, the lender’s 
country is set as the country of the affiliate/subsidiary. Similarly, for firms receiving loans through their foreign 
subsidiaries we set the borrower’s country as the country of the affiliate/subsidiary. For example, although Citibank 
(the parent bank) is headquartered in the U.S., for loans provided by Citibank International Plc, we set the lender’s 
country as the UK. In sensitivity tests, we examine cases of cross-border loans where the lending bank has an 
affiliate or subsidiary in the borrower’s country, by identifying all banks’ subsidiaries/affiliates in the borrower’s 
country. Similarly, we further identify all firms’ subsidiaries/affiliates in the borrower’s country, although the 
number of these subsidiaries is relatively small. 
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country-level socioeconomic and political effects on bank lending.5 We however adopt more 
restrictive fixed effects in subsequent specifications.  
In this regard, through the fielding of firm fixed effects we control for firms’ credit risk 
and performance and any residual firm-side effects not captured by our set of firm-level 
characteristics, while through firm’s industry effects we control for characteristics common to 
the firm’s industry that may affect firms within that industry equally. We further control for 
forces stemming from the macroeconomic environment in the borrower’s country through the 
inclusion of borrower’s country effects. Finally, we include loan type and loan purpose fixed 
effects; the former are important since loan facilities include credit lines and term loans, which 
have fundamental differences in their contractual arrangements and pricing (see Berg, 
Saunders, and Steffen, 2016), while the latter control for the purpose of the loan (e.g., corporate 
purposes, working capital, takeovers or acquisitions, debt repayment, etc.). 
 
4. The effect of Bank- and Firm-level COVID-19 exposure on the Cost of Credit. 
4.1. Baseline results. 
We begin our analysis by looking at Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure. 
In Table 2 we sequentially include different combinations of our set of bank- and firm-level 
exposure measures. This allows us to isolate the effect of lender’s exposure from that of the 
borrower’s and further identify whether the positive effect exerted by the exposure to the 
pandemic is lender- or borrower-driven. Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of Equation 
(1) including the coefficient estimates and t-statistics obtained from standard errors clustered 
by the bank.6 Our preferred specification includes year, bank, and lender’s country fixed effects. 
                                                 
5
 These are country factors affecting all banks and firms within a country. Several studies examine such macro 
effects on international bank lending (e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020; and the associated references), and in 
this study these effects are fully controlled for via the fixed effects.  
6




Given that we compare the year of the pandemic with the year before, we choose the set of 
fixed effects as they control to a reasonable extent for time-invariant bank characteristics and 
macroeconomic fundamentals without being overburdened by fixed effects, thereby allowing 
for sufficient variation in our variable of interest. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In the first column of Table 2, we only include Bank COVID-19 exposure, while in 
column (2) we only include Firm COVID-19 exposure. The coefficient on either exposure 
measure is positive and statistically significant, ranging between 17.0 and 8.5 basis points in 
response to a one standard deviation increase in our measures (=47.2 basis points × 0.37 and 
14.9 basis points × 0.57 for the bank-level and the firm-level measure respectively). In column 
(3), both of our measures are included concurrently in the regression. Although either measure 
retains its positive and statistically significant value, interestingly, much of the effect of Firm 
COVID-19 exposure is picked up by Bank COVID-19 exposure. This reveals the relative 
dominance of the lender’s exposure for the determination of loan spreads over the borrower’s 
exposure; a one standard deviation increase in the former increases AISD by 11.1 basis points 
(=30.8 basis points × 0.37), which is more than double the size of the relevant increase of 5.1 
basis points (=8.9 basis points × 0.57) stemming from the firm-level measure. 
 Based on specification (3), the main coefficients of interest, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 point to an 
economically sizeable effect of bank- and firm-level COVID-19 exposure on loan spreads, 
equal to a 6.6% (=11.1 basis points ÷ 167.2 basis points) and 3.0% (=5.1 basis points ÷ 167.2 
basis points) increase respectively for the average loan in our sample. Given that the average 
loan size is USD 1,080 million, an increase in the bank’s COVID-19 exposure is translated into 
approximately USD 1.2 million (=USD 1,088 million × 11.1 basis points) per year in additional 
interest, while an increase in the firm’s exposure to USD 0.55 million (=USD 1,088 million × 
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5.1 basis points). For an average loan maturity of 4.3 years, the additional interest rises to USD 
5.16 million and USD 2.37 million respectively over the loan’s duration.7 
In Table 3 we consider distinct sets of fixed effects: in column (1), we start with our less 
demanding specification where we include bank fixed effects, while in column (2), we add year 
fixed effects. In column (3), we introduce lender country fixed effects that control for general 
macroeconomic conditions in the bank’s country, along with borrower’s fixed effects that 
control for time-invariant firm traits. Specification (4) is even more demanding, as we add 
borrower’s industry and borrower’s country fixed effects, controlling for developments within 
the firm’s industry and the macroeconomic environment in the borrowing firm’s country 
respectively, while our last specification (column 5), introduces loan type and purpose fixed 
effects that control for the different types and purposes of the loan facilities. Across all 
specifications, the coefficients on Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are 
consistently positive and statistically significant at all conventional levels. Based on our 
estimates in Tables 2-3 and consistent with Hypothesis 1, we can infer that greater exposure of 
banks and firms to the COVID-19 pandemic substantially increases the cost of loans, ceteris 
paribus.  
In Table A2 of the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the “bad 
controls” problem by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from our 
specifications.89 Irrespective of the specifications used, the coefficients on our COVID-19 
exposure measures retain their positive, statistically significant value, ranging between 9.7-11.4 
basis points and 3-4.8 basis points per one standard deviation increase in the bank-level and the 
                                                 
7
 Assuming 4.3 annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 4.9 
million and USD 2.25 million for the average 12-month LIBOR rate of 1.97% during our sample period (for similar 
calculations, see Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
8
 Since the “bad controls” problem is due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an alternative 
sensitivity test, we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm (results 
available upon request). 
9
 The replacement (or addition) of General covenants with the number of financial covenants or net covenants 
leaves our results unchanged. 
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firm-level measure, respectively. We further run a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model 
that accounts for the simultaneous setting of the price and non-price loan terms by the lending 
banks at the time of the loan origination (Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler, 2014). In this setting, 
we estimate a system of regressions, where in addition to AISD, several different loan terms, 
namely Loan amount, Maturity, and Collateral, and our COVID-19 exposure measures (Bank 
COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure) are regressed on the same set of regressors 
in our baseline equation (including the AISD). Results in Table A3 confirm the robustness of 
our baseline OLS estimates.10 
The size and magnitude of the coefficients on the control variables in Tables 2-3 are in 
line with the prior works of Bae and Goyal (2009), Ivashina (2009), Cai, Eidam, Saunders, and 
Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2020). In particular, loan spreads decrease with 
loan amount and increase with maturity and collateral; they are further more competitively 
priced when more lenders and covenants are included in the loan facility. The role of bank and 
firm characteristics is consisted with our anticipation - greater size associated with decreasing 
AISD, while greater return on bank (firm) assets further increases (decreases) spreads. 
Overall, results from our baseline estimations reveal that the lender’s exposure to 
COVID-19 constitutes the main contributing factor to higher loan spreads, while the firm-
specific credit risk stemming from the borrower’s exposure also exerts a meaningful, although 
less potent effect. In what follows, we examine the role of government restrictions to contain 
the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic, the central bank interventions targeting credit supply, 
and the financial constraints of firms that determine credit demand. 
 
4.2. Government responses to COVID-19. 
                                                 
10
 For expositional purposes, we only report estimates from the regressions where the dependent variable is AISD. 
The estimates from the other equations in the model are available on request. 
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An implicit assumption in our identification strategy is that loans carry a higher interest rate 
following an increase in the lending bank’s and borrowing firm’s exposure to COVID-19. 
However, this exposure is not only a function of the bank’s and firm’s activities, but it could 
also be contingent on the domestic economic environment and conditions in which the loan 
counterparties operate. In response to the developing pandemic, national governments adopted 
various measures to limit the spread of the virus with a consequent impact on economic activity. 
If counterparties operate in economies with high restrictions where economic activity is 
essentially at a stand-still, we would expect the demand for loans to increase as firms look for 
funding sources to cover fixed expenses. This is because higher stringency measures and 
economic restrictions increase the level of uncertainty and risk aversion domestically. 
We expect banks and firms to be equally affected, since higher stringency exerts a 
supply side and a demand-side effect, lowering the bank supply of credit and increasing the 
firm demand for credit, respectively. In such a case, we should observe a premium in loan 
spreads in the presence of greater restrictions over and above the premium observed following 
a generic increase in each counterparty’s exposure. To examine this contingency, we consider 
the stringency index of Hale, Angrist, Kira, Petherick, Phillips, and Webster (2020) that 
captures variation in containment and closure policies in response to COVID-19 across 
countries.11 We present results in Table 4, where we interact with each of our bank- and firm-
level exposure measures with the stringency index in the relevant counterparty’s country. To 
allow for the direct interpretation of the coefficient estimates on both the interaction terms and 
the main terms, we mean-center the variables included in the interaction terms. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
11
 The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values reflecting higher stringency and concerns nine key areas: 
school closing, workplace closing, cancelled public events, restrictions on gatherings, close public transport, stay 




Initially, we consider the degree of restrictions in the lender’s country (column 1). 
According to our estimates, loans from banks operating in countries with high stringency 
measures carry an additional interest rate premium (positive coefficient on Bank COVID-19 
exposure × Lender’s stringency). The additional cost amounts to approximately 2.7 basis points 
(=0.309 basis points × 0.36 × 24.14) following a one standard deviation increase in our bank’s 
exposure and stringency measures. What matters is that this increase is independent of the 
higher interest rate charged following an increase in the bank’s exposure to the pandemic: the 
latter is reflected on the coefficient on Bank COVID-19 exposure, which remains statistically 
significant and within the range suggested by our baseline estimates. 
We consequently examine the level of stringency in the borrower’s country (column 2). 
Again, we find that greater government restrictions increase the cost of credit for borrowing 
firms with a higher exposure to COVID-19 (coefficient on interaction term). These firms 
receive loans with an additional 2.1 bps higher spread relative to firms in countries with lesser 
restrictions. This is almost 36% of the premium charged following an increase in the firm’s 
COVID-19 exposure regardless of the restrictions adopted (coefficient on Firm COVID-19 
exposure). The positive differential effect of higher government restrictions on loan spreads is 
further confirmed in specification (3), where we consider both stringency measures. 
Specifically, spreads increase by 2.5 and 2.1 basis points in response to a one standard deviation 
increase in the lender’s and borrower’s stringency measures respectively (coefficients on 
interaction terms). More importantly, this response is over and above the generic increase 
attributed to a rise in the bank’s and the firm’s exposure to the pandemic (coefficients on main 
terms). Our analysis suggests that the level of restrictions adopted domestically, as well as on 
cross-border movements of goods and services, aggravated the increase in the borrowing costs 




4.3. Central bank responses to COVID-19. 
Having established the added importance of higher government restrictions during the COVID-
19 pandemic, we now turn our focus to measures adopted at the monetary policy front. Major 
central banks, such as the ECB and the Fed, immensely expanded the scope of their repurchase 
agreement operations (both in terms of amount and maturity) to direct cash to the money 
markets. This served as a precautionary backstop to address pandemic-related liquidity in case 
of market dysfunction resulting from the coronavirus shock that might hamper the smooth 
transmission of monetary policy. It was further accompanied by central bank purchases of 
private and public sector securities in the secondary market.12 
As such, our approach in this subsection is two-fold: a) to examine whether central bank 
liquidity provisions mitigated the aggravating effect of bank- and firm-level exposure on loan 
spreads, and b) to identify the potential effect of outright central bank interventions in the form 
asset purchases. To accomplish this, we estimate specifications including the double 
interactions between our bank- and firm-level exposure measures with the repo rate in either 
the lender’s or borrower’s country and indicators for the periods covering the conduct of central 
bank asset purchases. Since European and U.S. entities (banks or firms) dominate our sample 
and given the importance of the euro and the United States dollar for the functioning of global 
financial markets, we limit our analysis to the sub-sample of European and U.S. lenders. We 
present results in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
12
 The ECB initiated the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) in March 2020 in order to counter 
the serious risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the outlook for the euro area due to the 
COVID-19 outbreak. Under this temporary asset purchase programme, private and public sector securities of €600 
billion were scheduled to be purchased; on 4 June 2020, this amount was increased by an additional €750 billion 
to a total of €1,350 billion. The Federal Reserve initiated the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
(SMCCF), which was announced on 23 March 2020. This facility included the purchase of corporate bonds, with 




According to our estimates, the level of repo rate in the lender’s country is not able to 
contain the effect of stemming from the bank’s increasing exposure to COVID-19; the 
coefficient on Bank COVID-19 exposure × Repo rate (lender) in column (1) is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This stands in contrast to the repo rate in the firm’s country, 
the decrease of which enables firms to reverse the loan spread increase resulting from their 
COVID-19 exposure: a one standard deviation decrease in Repo rate (lender) saves firms that 
experience an increase in their COVID-19 exposure approximately 14.8 basis points off their 
spreads (coefficient on Firm COVID-19 exposure × Repo rate (borrower) in column 2). This is 
in turn over 40% of the generic spread increase because of the firm’s exposure to COVID-19 
(coefficient on main term in column (2)). The easing capacity of the repo rate in the firm’s 
country and its importance relative to the repo rate in the bank’s country is further confirmed 
in specification (3), where the regression includes the simultaneous interaction of the bank- and 
firm-level exposure measures with the relevant repo rates in the bank’s and firm’s countries.  
On the same line, specifications (4)-(6) examine the differential effect of central bank 
interventions. Again, only those interventions conducted in the borrower’s country appear able 
to reverse the aggravating effect of COVID-19 on the borrowing costs of the country’s firms. 
On the other hand, the period covering the central bank purchases in the lender’s country is not 
associated with a statistically significant effect on the exposed banks’ spreads. We conclude 
that while central bank measures (either by affecting the repo rate or in the form of asset 
purchases) are not able to ease the pressures on loan spreads stemming from the lenders’ 
exposure to the pandemic, they are nevertheless successful in containing the borrowing firms’ 
exposure. This in turn provides partial support for Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.4. Firm financial constraints. 
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Our next exercise concerns the role of financial constraints of the borrowing firms. Financially 
constrained firms have reduced access to credit or access to higher cost of credit, which 
deteriorates their performance prospects, especially during turbulent periods or when 
experiencing financial distress; the resulting deterioration in firm fundamentals further 
increases default risk fueling a vicious cycle (see Bruche and González-Aguado, 2010; 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010; Behr, Norden, and Noth, 2013). Given that, we expect 
that higher constraints inflate borrowing costs for firms with greater exposure to the pandemic. 
To examine this conjecture we interact our bank and firm COVID-19 exposure measures 
with a series of indicators reflecting the level of financial constraints and default risk of the 
borrowing firm. Our first indicator is a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s Whited 
and Wu (2006) index is in the top tercile of our sample and zero if the index is in the bottom 
tercile (see Farre-Mensa and  Ljungqvist, 2016). Estimates in column (1) suggest that greater 
financial constraints raise loan spreads for exposed firms; furthermore, these constraints are 
priced equally by banks and firms for a level of COVID-19 exposure as the coefficients on both 
interaction terms are positive and statistically significant. Importantly, a firm’s exposure to 
COVID-19 does not raise loan spreads unless the firm is top tercile of the index (negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on Firm COVID-19 exposure). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In column (2) we replicate column (1) by replacing our financial constraints measure 
with an indicator based on the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (Constrained (KZ index)). 
Again, results confirm the positive effect of financial constraints on the borrowing costs of 
exposed firms. We further examine whether the effect of COVID-19 exposure varies according 
to the default risk of the borrowing firms. In column (3), we distinguish between high and low 
default risk firms based on the firms’ Altman’s (1968) Z-Score. Estimates reveal that default 
risk contributes to the rise in the exposed firms’ borrowing costs on top of the banks’ and firms’ 
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exposure to the pandemic (positive and statistically significant coefficients on both interaction 
and main terms). Overall, findings in this section provide support for Hypothesis 3 and our 
initial claim that COVID-19 has an adverse effect on firm balance sheets, rendering firms less 
attractive as borrowers. Banks in turn respond to the increasing demand for loans from these 
cash strapped firms by offering loans at higher rates.  
 
4.5. Additional results. 
An extension of our empirical analysis relates to the role of loan fees, since we might expect 
that greater exposure to the pandemic increases the cost of loans through lower fees. However, 
data on fees is limited since several loan facilities are term loans that have limited fees. 
Nonetheless, in Table A4 we replicate Table 2 with AISU as the dependent variable. Across the 
first two specifications, we observe a statistically significant effect of Bank COVID-19 exposure 
and Firm COVID-19 exposure on AISU that amounts to 23.1 basis points and 15.1 basis points 
respectively per one standard deviation increase in either measure. Importantly, the 
specification including both measures (column 3) points to the dominance of the bank-level 
measure over its firm-level counterpart; it thus appears that the increase of fees is primarily a 
result of greater exposure on the lending’s bank size. 
Further, to make sure that our inferences are not sensitive to the clustering (also given 
the multi-level and multi-country nature of our data), we also cluster standard errors by lender’s 
country, borrowing firm, borrower’s country, lending bank-borrowing firm pair, and lender’s 
country-borrower’s country pair (see Table A5). Results are similar to the baseline. Our OLS 
estimations, thus far, have assumed that all loans enter the model with equal weights. Normally, 
the different fixed effects in Table 3 provide a safeguard against cross-country variation. We 
acknowledge that the empirical specification might leave the analysis open to the critique that 
countries receiving fewer loans might affect our results disproportionately. We re-estimate our 
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preferred model specification using weighted least squares and several different weights. The 
results in Table A6 are almost identical to our baseline. 
Our results could also be subject to a sample-selection bias, in the sense that the 
variables driving our findings might further determine the firm’s decision to receive a loan from 
the particular bank. It may be case, for instance, firms within a country are ones more likely to 
request a loan. To eliminate this potential selection bias from our estimates, we follow (Dass 
and Massa, 2011) and employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to calculate the probability 
of a firm entering into a loan deal. In the first stage, we run a probit model to estimate the firm’s 
loan-taking decision. During this stage, we extend our loan sample to includes all syndicated 
loan facilities available in Dealscan for our sample period. We calculate Heckman’s lambda 
(inverse mills ratio) and include it as an additional control variable in the second-stage OLS 
estimation of specifications (1)-(3) of Table A7. 
In line with  Dass and Massa (2011), we assume that the borrower’s decision to get a 
syndicated loan is a function of the key determinants of the decision to borrow. Consequently, 
we augment our probit regression with a set of loan-, bank-, and firm-level characteristics; a set 
of annual weights for the number of loans to a firm (Firm loans) and the number of loans 
between a given bank-firm pair (Bank-firm loans); loan type and purpose, year, firm, and 
borrower’s country dummies. 
We present results from this exercise in columns (1)-(3) of Table A7 (Panels A and B). 
Probit estimates in Panel A, show that loans of greater amount are more likely to be granted, 
particularly if collateral is pledged and loan arrangements include pricing provisions and 
covenants. Larger firms with less reliance on debt are less likely to opt for loan financing. More 
importantly, estimates from the second-stage regressions (columns (1)-(3) of Panel B) confirm 
the strong positive impact of our bank- and firm-level exposure measures on AISD (as reflected 
in the coefficients on Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure).  
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Finally, we control for changes in the bank’s and firm’s fundamentals as well as 
differences in the economic environment in the lender’s and borrower’s countries. Specifically, 
we include additional bank controls (non-performing loans, equity capital), firm controls 
(equity, tangible assets, debt, retained earnings, sales, EBITDA), country economic controls 
(GDP, price level) and general economic controls (global stock price volatility). These variables 
should exhibit a strong correlation strongly with our baseline set of fixed effects and control 
variables, to the extent that these variables change slowly over time. We do not use all indicators 
at once, due to their high pair-wise correlations. Again, results in Table A8 confirm our baseline 
estimates on the effect of Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure on AISD. 
 
5. Analyzing the mechanisms. 
Thus far, our analysis points to a higher cost of loans in response to greater exposure of the 
lending banks and borrowing firms to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this section, we identify the 
mechanisms through which this exposure materializes into higher firm borrowing costs. By 
building on our findings, we examine whether the effect of this exposure on loan spreads varies 
across different bank and firm types, and whether it is contingent on the ability of the borrower’s 
country to attract investors or the formation of the syndicate. 
 
5.1 Exploring the mechanisms: Lender fundamentals. 
The present section considers alternative supply side explanations of our findings and identifies 
certain bank traits that act as drivers of our results. To this end, Table 7 includes the interaction 
of our bank-level COVID-19 exposure measure with several bank characteristics reflecting the 
bank’s size, profitability and capital adequacy. Specification (1) reveals that the effect of bank-
level exposure on firm cost of credit is concentrated in large borrowers. According to column 
(2), a bank’s COVID-19 exposure relates inversely to its return on assets, suggesting that 
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stronger bank performance acts as a counterforce to raising loan spreads. Specifically, banks 
achieving an additional 0.43% return on their assets can cut spreads by approximately 3.1 basis 
points thereby reversing 30% of the generic increase in response to the bank’s COVID-19 
exposure (coefficient on Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank ROA and Bank ROA respectively).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In the next two specifications, we consider measures reflecting the bank’s capital policy 
and solvency risk. Estimates from specification (3) point to a positive relationship between the 
bank’s capital ratio and spreads. This is intuitive as bank capital matters in the propagation of 
different types of shocks to lending, especially in the presence of regulatory capital constraints 
and imperfections in the market for bank fund-raising (see Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; 
Santos and Winton, 2009). Increasing capital by one standard deviation (or 2.28%) raises loan 
spreads by almost 2 basis points or 18% on top of the increase attributed to the bank’s COVID-
19 exposure (coefficients on interaction term and main term respectively). Nevertheless, as 
column (4) suggests, the proportion of non-performing loans in their portfolio is not a material 
factor for loan spreads. Overall, consistent with Hypothesis 4, the analysis in this section shows 
that the effect of the lender’s exposure varies with the lending bank’s size and capital base.  
 
5.2 Exploring the mechanisms: Borrower fundamentals. 
We further examine potential demand-side explanations relating to firm fundamentals and 
performance. Like the previous section, we interact with our firm-level COVID-19 exposure 
measure with a series of indicators reflecting the firm’s size, profitability, capital structure and 
financing flexibility. We present results in Table 8, where we observe that larger firms enjoy a 
competitive advantage relative to smaller ones in reversing the aggravating effects of their 
COVID-19 exposure on their borrowing costs (positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the interaction term in column (1)). However, we don’t observe the same when considering 
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firm profitability, as the relevant interaction term in specification (2) enters with a non-
statistically significant sign. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We subsequently consider the firm’s decision regarding its capital structure 
(specifications (3) and (4)). Although there is a non-statistically significant effect of firm 
leverage on the loan spreads of exposed firms (column (3)), we nevertheless observe a negative 
relationship between the firm’s use of equity capital and loan spreads, as better capitalized firms 
face lower borrowing costs (column (4)). From a similar perspective, firms relying more on 
tangible assets appear able to reverse the higher loan spreads for a given level of COVID-19 
exposure: as specification (5) suggests, increasing Firm tangibility by one standard deviation 
enables firms to reverse almost 50% of the original spread increase resulting from their COVID-
19 exposure (coefficients on interaction term and main term respectively). 
Finally, we examine the differential effect of the firm’s listing status, since listing on a 
foreign stock exchange presents the issuing firm with an incentive to commit to providing 
higher quality financial information and exposes the company to further scrutiny of reputable 
intermediaries (see Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Shi, Magnan, and Kim, 2012). The dual 
pressures from both host and home countries’ stock exchanges ensures that cross-listed firms 
provide credible information to market participants, thereby making them more adept at 
attracting alternative sources of financing, while their product market internationalization 
translates into a higher likelihood that managers will issue forecasts, thereby minimizing the 
information asymmetry about their future prospects and performance (see Saudagaran, 1988; 
Hillman and Wan, 2005). For all these reasons we expect that cross-listed firms are less 
sensitive to the aggravating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic relative to domestically listed 
companies. Indeed, estimates from column (6) suggest that the effect of Firm COVID-19 
exposure on AISD is completely offset for cross-listed firms. Altogether, consistent with 
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Hypothesis 5, this section reveals that the effect of the borrower’s exposure is contingent on the 
borrowing firm’s size as well as its listing status and prior transactions with the lending bank.  
 
5.3 Exploring the mechanisms: Institutional investors. 
We consequently examine whether the borrower’s country ability to attract institutional 
investors relieves some pressure on loan spreads stemming from the lenders’ and borrowers’ 
exposure to COVID-19. Institutional quality is important in our context, since powerful 
institutions and the ability to attract institutional investors are largely considered a driving force 
shaping firm performance and borrowing costs (see, among others, Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; 
Qian and Strahan, 2007). In fact, their presence may reduce firm cost of credit as firms with 
greater proportions of institutional investors are likely to have lower agency costs due to better 
monitoring. This alleviates the need for banks to engage in monitoring, thereby passing the 
savings to the borrowing firms in the form of lower interest rates (see Bhojraj and Sengupta, 
2003; Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner, 2019). For these reasons, we expect that greater 
institutional investor involvement provides a positive signal to the lending banks, easing the 
aggravating effect of COVID-19 exposure on loan spreads.  
We test this conjecture in Table 9 by interacting our measures of bank and firm COVID-
19 exposure with several variables reflecting the level of institutional ownership in the 
borrower’s countries. These variables concern the extent of firm disclosure intensity, the 
strength of legal rights, and the strength of legal contracts. Across columns (1)-(3), we observe 
a negative differential effect of our institutional variables on loan spreads (coefficients on 
interaction terms). Most importantly, we observe this differential effect for both exposed banks 
and firms. We additionally distinguish between countries in the top tercile of our sample in 
terms of institutional quality and protection and interact the relevant binary indicators with our 
exposure measures (columns (4)-(6)). Again, we find that the effect of Bank COVID-19 
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exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure is considerably mitigated for countries in the top band 
of institutional scores. We conclude that countries with the strong presence of institutional 
investors and strong institutional environment can contain somewhat the exacerbating effect of 
bank- and firm-level COVID-19 exposure on loan spreads. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
5.4. Exploring the mechanisms: Relationship lending. 
Two potential sources of heterogeneity in the effect of bank- and firm-level COVID-19 
exposure on loan spreads that can further help alleviate the negative implications of this 
exposure is the formation of lending ties and the utilization of bank and firm subsidiaries. Prior 
lending relationships allow lenders to acquire valuable information about the borrowing firm’s 
operations and credit risk. It is therefore reasonable to expect that firms with prior lending ties 
with their banks might receive lower loan spreads relative to non-relationship borrowers. In this 
regard, relationship lending could act to reverse the negative repercussions from the banks’ and 
firms’ growing exposure to the pandemic. We test this hypothesis in Table 10, by interacting 
our variables of main interest with Lending relationship, a variable reflecting the existence of a 
prior lending relationship between the bank-firm pair over the previous 3-year period (see, 
e.g.,  Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2011; Dass and Massa, 2011).  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 Estimates in column (1) suggest that relationship borrowers can save approximately 
18.9 basis points or over 54% of the generic spread increase because of the bank’s COVID-19 
exposure (coefficients on Bank COVID-19 exposure × Lending relationship and Bank COVID-
19 exposure respectively); however, a prior lending relationship does not ease the aggravating 
effect of the firm’s exposure on loan spreads (coefficient on Firm COVID-19 exposure × 
Lending relationship). The offsetting effect of relationship lending further increases with the 
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size and magnitude of this relationship: the greater the number or the amount of loans between 
the given bank-firm pair during the previous 3-year period, the greater the interest rate savings 
for the borrowing firms (columns (2) and (3)). Overall, these estimates suggest that the resulting 
minimization of the information asymmetry due to the formation of lending relationships is 
mainly of a supply side nature. 
Consequently, we examine the role of subsidiaries. When the lending bank operates an 
affiliate or subsidiary in the borrower’s country, it can gain access to important information 
about the borrower’s creditworthiness and operations. The bank is more accustomed to the 
domestic economic environment, while it can further remove part of macroeconomic risk if it 
can fund the loan through its affiliate/subsidiary by resorting to the domestic wholesale markets. 
We therefore expect that borrowers, resorting to lenders with subsidiaries in the borrower’s 
country, minimize the information asymmetry regarding the firm’s credit risk and the domestic 
macroeconomic risk. Estimates in column (4), verify this conjecture as loans granted from 
banks with domestic subsidiaries carry an approximately 75% lower spread than the average 
loans directed to exposed firms (coefficients on Firm COVID-19 exposure × Bank subsidiary 
and Firm COVID-19 exposure respectively). Similar reasoning applies to firms operating 
subsidiaries in the lead bank’s country: borrowers can communicate important information 
about their operations to the lender in order to reduce information asymmetry. However, as 
estimates in specification (5) reveal, this is not sufficient to lower spreads.  
 
6. The role of syndicate structure 
A potential channel through which the aggravating effect of COVID-19 exposure could 
manifest is syndicate structure, which operates via other lenders that join the lead bank in 
forming a syndicate. Since the exposure to the pandemic has both a supply side and a demand-
side nature, relating to the bank’s and firm’s exposure respectively, this manifestation takes two 
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forms. The first is contingent on the lender’s exposure. If syndicate members are unfamiliar 
with the lead bank and/or concerned with the lead’s pandemic exposure, this gives rise to an 
adverse selection problem wherein the lead bank must convince of its solid credit reputation. 
Being part of a more dispersed syndicate serves a certification effect, easing potential adverse 
selection and subsequent moral hazard concerns regarding the lead bank’s fundamentals and 
risk exposure (Ivashina, 2009; Sufi, 2007). In our setting, the addition of more lenders and the 
spread of loan shares across the syndicate would require a compensation (in the form of higher 
loan spreads) for the syndicate members. In other words, we expect the formation of a more 
dispersed syndicate to interact with Bank COVID-19 exposure in increasing AISD. 
The second form relates to the borrower’s exposure. This gives rise to a moral hazard 
problem for the informed lead bank because the informed lead’s monitoring and due diligence 
effort is unobservable by the other syndicate members; to ensure diligence, the lead bank must 
retain a larger loan share in the borrowing firm to alleviate concerns that exerts the necessary 
effort in due diligence and monitoring (Sufi, 2007).13 As such, we expect the formation of a 
more concentrated syndicate to lower spreads through its interaction with Firm COVID-19 
exposure. 
 Below, we examine how syndicate structure helps alleviate the effect of the pandemic 
by interacting our bank- and firm-level exposure measures with several loan characteristics 
reflecting the size and structure of the syndicate. We present the results in Table 11, with 
estimates from column (1) showing that an increase in the syndicate’s number of lenders results 
in a rise in the spreads. Specifically, including seven additional lenders in the syndicate (i.e., 
increasing Number of lenders by approximately one standard deviation) raises spreads by 
almost 5.6 basis points. Importantly, we observe this effect for the interaction of Number of 
                                                 
13
 Several other studies document that syndicate structure varies in regards to borrower attributes related to credit 




lenders with Bank COVID-19 exposure, suggesting that the bank’s exposure is a material 
concern for the syndicate members who require a premium for partnering with the exposed 
bank. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 Columns (2)-(3) feature the interaction of our COVID-19 exposure measures with the 
lead bank’s loan share and syndicate concentration, respectively. Both specifications confirm 
the spread premium required for the formation of a wider and less concentrated syndicate. 
According to column (2), decreasing Bank share by one standard deviation (or 11.2%) results 
in a higher AISD by approximately 3.5 basis points (coefficient on Bank COVID-19 exposure 
× Bank share). This is further reflected in syndicate structure, with a decrease in the syndicate’s 
Herfindahl index (i.e., the formation of a less concentrated syndicate) resulting in an additional 
increase of similar magnitude in the loan spread (coefficient on Bank COVID-19 exposure × 
Syndicate Herfindahl). 
 Overall, across all specifications, the coefficient on our bank- and firm-level exposure 
measures remain positive and statistically significant, confirming the aggravating effect of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on syndicated loan spreads. However, the bank’s exposure is an 
additional consideration for syndicate members in their decision to join the syndicate. As a 
result, the formation of a wider and less concentrated syndicate requires the setting of a higher 
loan spread charged due to the lead bank’s exposure. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the pricing of syndicated 
loans. We provide evidence of a rise in the cost of syndicated loans following an increase in the 
lending banks’ and borrowing firms’ exposure to COVID-19. We maintain that this increase is 
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of a supply side (primarily) and demand-side (secondarily) nature as loan spreads respond to 
both bank- and firm-level exposure. 
Our baseline specification shows that a one standard deviation increase in our bank-
level exposure measure raises loan spreads by over 11 basis points (or 6.6%), while the 
equivalent increase attributed to our firm-level measure is over 5 basis points (or 3%). This 
renders firms subject to a loss of about USD 5.16 million and USD 2.37 million respectively in 
interest expense over the duration of the average loan. These results persist in an array of 
sensitivity exercises and alternative estimation methods and are magnified by the level of 
government restrictions adopted at the national level to tackle the pandemic’s outbreak. On the 
other hand, interventions at the monetary policy front are only effective in easing the pressures 
on loan spreads stemming from the borrower’s rather than the lenders’ exposure. 
We further show that the effect of the pandemic is heterogeneous to the bank’s and 
firm’s financial health and performance. In specific, loans are more expensive when granted 
from larger, better capitalized but less-profitable banks. However, for larger and non-financially 
constrained firms that are listed on multiple stock exchanges and rely more on equity financing 
the aggravating effect of COVID-19 is much less potent, if at all present. 
We also find that institutional quality acts as a counterforce to the exacerbating effects 
of the pandemic. Firms headquartered in countries with a strong institutional environment that 
can attract institutional investors receive lower spreads for a given level of lender’s and 
borrower’s exposure. Even for exposed firms, there are two strategies to mitigate the 
pandemic’s adverse effects. The first concerns the formation of strong bank-firm relationships, 
which reduces the upward pressure on loan spreads stemming from the bank’s exposure. From 
a similar perspective, borrowing from a bank’s subsidiary further minimizes information 
asymmetry due to the firm’s exposure. 
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We finally document the implications for the syndicate structure. In response to growing 
bank exposure, the formation of a wider and less concentrated syndicate comes at the expense 
of higher spreads, as syndicate members require an additional compensation to partner with the 
exposed lead bank. Our results are a first step in understanding how varying exposure of loan 
counterparties to the COVID-19 pandemic affects loan pricing. An important extension would 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) 
for all variables used in the estimations of the main text. All variables are defined in Table A1.  
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 4,117 167.20 87.97 7.00 825.00 
AISU 2,171 21.28 12.05 0.75 90.00 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 4,117 0.10 0.36 0.00 2.56 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 4,117 0.16 0.57 0.00 6.58 
Loan amount 4,117 20.19 1.17 14.73 23.75 
Maturity 4,117 3.81 0.60 1.10 5.48 
Collateral 4,117 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 4,117 12.89 7.40 1.00 48.00 
Performance provisions 4,117 0.64 1.71 0.00 10.00 
General covenants 4,117 0.74 1.01 0.00 4.00 
Financial covenants 4,117 0.72 0.98 0.00 4.00 
Net covenants 4,117 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Bank share 4,117 11.98 11.12 1.02 100.00 
Syndicate’s Herfindahl 4,117 1,178.36 1,119.80 93.02 10,000.00 
Relationship lending 4,117 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending number 4,117 0.15 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending amount 4,117 0.15 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Bank subsidiary 3,565 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Firm subsidiary 3,931 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Bank size 4,117 14.16 0.88 10.95 14.83 
Bank ROA 4,117 1.00 0.43 0.02 1.71 
Bank capital 4,117 15.85 2.28 12.02 21.80 
Bank NPLs 3,557 0.37 0.38 0.02 2.45 
Institutional lender 4,099 0.01 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Firm size 4,117 9.12 1.68 4.37 17.48 
Firm ROA 4,117 7.83 5.33 -45.83 39.27 
Firm leverage 4,117 31.28 16.19 0.00 80.88 
Firm equity 4,117 7.87 1.61 1.45 14.89 
Firm tangibility 3,958 26.08 24.09 0.00 95.95 
Cross-listed 2,336 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
GDP growth 4,117 -0.29 0.81 -6.83 2.40 
GDP per capita 4,117 -697.78 10,372.45 -67,377.83 56,987.04 
Lender’s stringency 3,541 14.12 24.14 0.00 82.27 
Borrower’s stringency 3,531 8.87 15.47 0.00 97.35 
Repo rate (lender) 3,499 1.71 0.89 0.01 2.48 
Repo rate (borrower) 3,780 1.83 0.80 0.01 2.48 
Constrained (WW index) 2,217 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Constrained (WW index) 2,005 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
High default risk 2,390 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Investor disclosure 4,117 7.43 0.73 0.00 10.00 
Credit rights 4,117 10.38 1.85 1.00 11.00 




Table 2. Baseline results: Lender’s exposure vs borrower’s exposure 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by 
bank. Each specification includes a different combination of the lender’s exposure and the 
borrower’s exposure measures. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in 
each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 47.198***  30.836*** 
 [3.945]  [3.291] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure  14.916*** 8.924** 
  [4.544] [2.305] 
Loan amount -9.675*** -9.529*** -9.891*** 
 [-6.330] [-6.859] [-7.396] 
Maturity -5.756 4.896* 7.714*** 
 [-1.303] [1.879] [3.096] 
Collateral 78.596*** 56.153*** 54.832*** 
 [10.246] [10.509] [10.205] 
Number of lenders -1.477*** -0.587* -0.673* 
 [-3.815] [-1.799] [-1.775] 
Performance provisions 0.301 -0.887 -0.813 
 [0.370] [-1.529] [-1.360] 
General covenants -15.577*** -10.768*** -11.411*** 
 [-11.033] [-8.890] [-10.242] 
Bank size -92.933 -216.425 -397.289*** 
 [-0.375] [-1.666] [-3.045] 
Bank ROA 234.452*** 38.568 131.013*** 
 [4.511] [0.728] [3.240] 
Bank capital -17.787 8.025 -7.221 
 [-1.476] [1.047] [-0.992] 
Firm size -12.407*** -9.289*** -8.515*** 
 [-7.188] [-8.657] [-7.695] 
Firm ROA -2.692*** -2.422*** -2.583*** 
 [-8.044] [-11.235] [-12.608] 
Firm leverage 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 [3.483] [8.038] [8.162] 
GDP growth  -2.791 -0.887 -1.781 
 [-0.655] [-0.244] [-0.409] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [8.856] [8.171] [7.467] 
Constant 1,894.407 3,336.153* 6,031.291*** 
 [0.535] [1.794] [3.270] 
Observations 5,010 4,524 4,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.309 0.312 0.315 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 




Table 3. Different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given 
in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.708*** 30.681*** 26.514*** 21.098*** 19.764*** 
 [3.124] [3.273] [3.392] [2.988] [2.852] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 11.388*** 8.999** 3.882 6.241* 10.101*** 
 [2.806] [2.301] [1.499] [1.808] [3.572] 
Loan amount -10.021*** -10.023*** -1.485 -3.433** -2.540 
 [-7.333] [-7.373] [-1.084] [-2.245] [-1.537] 
Maturity 6.945*** 7.344*** 6.604* 3.591 5.968 
 [2.812] [2.884] [1.853] [0.852] [1.626] 
Collateral 55.406*** 55.201*** 20.024** 5.019 -0.616 
 [10.225] [10.129] [2.310] [0.639] [-0.067] 
Number of lenders -0.695* -0.660* -2.424*** -2.288*** -2.370*** 
 [-1.880] [-1.765] [-6.787] [-4.531] [-4.679] 
Performance provisions -0.772 -0.821 0.540 -0.575 -1.178 
 [-1.247] [-1.335] [0.517] [-0.488] [-0.783] 
General covenants -11.543*** -11.407*** -21.785*** -18.020*** -12.304** 
 [-10.203] [-10.169] [-4.749] [-3.054] [-2.106] 
Bank size -129.370** -395.800*** -194.744** -251.430*** -222.774*** 
 [-2.351] [-2.962] [-2.513] [-3.377] [-2.811] 
Bank ROA 129.629*** 126.205*** 62.665** 61.479** 55.273** 
 [2.881] [3.028] [2.112] [2.386] [2.269] 
Bank capital -4.131 -5.903 -2.886 -7.461** -7.333** 
 [-0.379] [-0.777] [-0.724] [-2.149] [-2.288] 
Firm size -8.427*** -8.437*** 15.362 -2.851 0.179 
 [-7.553] [-7.643] [0.841] [-0.229] [0.016] 
Firm ROA -2.608*** -2.604*** 0.716 -4.169*** -6.166*** 
 [-12.859] [-13.133] [0.390] [-3.340] [-4.397] 
Firm leverage 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.012 -0.104*** -0.102*** 
 [8.532] [8.279] [0.424] [-3.631] [-4.367] 
GDP growth  -4.240 -4.207 -27.994*** -26.945*** -25.411*** 
 [-0.992] [-0.989] [-3.437] [-4.322] [-5.078] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002* -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 [7.835] [7.951] [1.726] [-4.116] [-4.936] 
Constant 2,195.133*** 5,996.662*** 2,794.168** 3,923.729*** 3,481.422*** 
 [2.795] [3.171] [2.561] [3.814] [3.158] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 3,943 2,979 2,979 
Adj. R-squared 0.313 0.314 0.781 0.793 0.800 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects N Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y Y 
Firm effects N N Y Y Y 
Borrower’s industry effects N N N Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N N Y Y 




Table 4. Government restrictions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different 
specifications include the interactions of the lender and borrower exposure measures with lender and 
borrower stringency measures by Hale, Angrist, Kira, Petherick, Phillips, and Webster (2020). The lender’s 
(borrower’s) stringency measure is an index (0-100) that aggregates various measures of government 
responses to COVID-19 in the lender’s (borrower’s) country. In specification (1), Bank COVID-19 
exposure is interacted with Lender’s stringency, i.e., the stringency measure in the lender’s country. 
In specification (2), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Borrower’s stringency, i.e., the 
stringency measure in the borrower’s country. In specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure is 
interacted with Lender’s stringency and Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Borrower’s 
stringency. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The 
*, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 28.119*** 30.284*** 28.468*** 
 [3.293] [2.946] [3.384] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 11.545*** 10.442*** 11.415*** 
 [3.076] [3.089] [3.380] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Lender’s stringency 0.309**  0.284* 
 [2.137]  [1.937] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure  × Borrower’s stringency  0.243*** 0.236*** 
  [2.951] [2.987] 
Observations 3,541 3,531 3,523 
Adj. R-squared 0.315 0.315 0.320 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 




Table 5. Liquidity conditions and central bank interventions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications include the interactions of the lender and borrower exposure 
measures with the repo rates and indicators for central bank interventions in the form of public and private sector asset purchases. In 
specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Repo rate (lender), i.e., the repo rate in the lender’s country. In 
specification (2), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Repo rate (borrower), i.e., the repo rate in the borrower’s country. In 
specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Repo rate (lender) and Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with 
Repo rate (borrower). In specification (4), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Central bank intervention (lender), i.e., a 
binary variable equal to one for the period covering the conduct of asset purchases under the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP) and the corporate bond purchases under the Federal Reserve’s Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility 
(SMCCF) in the lender’s country, and zero otherwise. In specification (5), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Central bank 
intervention (borrower), i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the period covering the conduct of asset purchases under the ECB’s  
Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the corporate bond purchases under the Federal Reserve’s Secondary Market 
Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) in the borrower’s country, and zero otherwise. In specification (6), Bank COVID-19 exposure is 
interacted with Central bank intervention (borrower) and Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Central bank intervention 
(borrower). The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 28.715** 41.409*** 37.033** 5.875 51.078*** 56.424*** 
 [2.542] [4.090] [2.733] [1.248] [4.425] [6.242] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 11.529*** 64.709*** 66.942*** 15.526 24.352*** 18.267* 
 [3.101] [4.848] [4.713] [1.390] [3.279] [1.895] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Repo rate (lender) -6.053  -11.889    
 [-0.463]  [-0.841]    
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Repo rate  
(borrower) 
 32.496*** 32.750***    
 [4.415] [3.894]    
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Central bank  
intervention (lender) 
   -2.276  -2.043 
   [-0.187]  [-0.188] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Central bank  
intervention (borrower) 
    -54.978*** -58.197*** 
    [-4.928] [-5.844] 
Observations 3,499 3,780 3,278 3,499 3,780 3,278 
Adj. R-squared 0.306 0.330 0.319 0.306 0.329 0.320 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 6. Firm financial constraints and default probabilities 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications 
include the interaction of the lender and borrower exposure measures with measures of borrower’s financial 
constraints. In specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted 
with Constrained (WW index), i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s Whited-Wu index is 
in the top tercile of the sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile of the sample. In specification (2), 
Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Constrained (KZ index), i.e., 
a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s Kaplan-Zingales index is in the top tercile of the sample, 
and zero if it is in the bottom tercile of the sample. In specifications (3) Bank COVID-19 exposure and 
Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with High default risk, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the 
borrower’s Altman’s Z-score is in the top tercile of the sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile of the 
sample. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, 
and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 34.762*** 21.645*** 21.555** 
 
[3.271] [4.162] [2.617] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure -7.863* 16.795*** 26.005*** 
 [-1.906] [3.110] [3.604] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Constrained (WW index) 20.494***   
 [2.948]   
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Constrained (WW index) 13.947**   
 [2.344]   
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Constrained (KZ index)  -11.395  
  [-1.182]  
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Constrained (KZ index)  19.053**  
  [2.606]  
Bank COVID-19 exposure × High default risk   29.546** 
   [2.064] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure × High default risk   24.581** 
   [2.720] 
Observations 2,217 2,005 2,390 
Adj. R-squared 0.373 0.368 0.384 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 




Table 7. Examining the mechanisms: Lender characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications 
include the interactions of the lender’s exposure measure with a number of different lender characteristics. In 
specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Bank size i.e., the log of total bank assets. In 
specification (2), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Bank ROA, i.e., the return on total bank assets. 
In specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Bank capital, i.e., the ratio of bank capital 
to total assets. In specification (4), Bank COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Bank NPLs, i.e., the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in 
each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 39.950*** 28.972*** 30.584*** 29.183** 
 [9.860] [4.481] [5.064] [2.598] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 8.105** 9.338** 9.084** 10.542** 
 [2.377] [2.476] [2.409] [2.618] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank size 17.221***    
 [5.288]    
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank ROA  -20.238**   
  [-2.043]   
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank capital   2.432*  
   [1.818]  
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank NPLs    0.041 
    [0.001] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 3,557 
Adj. R-squared 0.318 0.316 0.316 0.309 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 




Table 8. Examining the mechanisms: Borrower characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications include the interactions of the borrower’s exposure measure 
with a number of different lender characteristics. In specification (1), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Firm size i.e., the log 
of total firm assets. In specification (2), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Firm ROA, i.e., the return on total firm assets. In 
specification (3), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with Firm leverage, i.e., the firm leverage. In specification (4), Firm COVID-
19 exposure is interacted with Firm equity, i.e., the log of firm equity capital. In specification (5), Firm COVID-19 exposure is 
interacted with Firm tangibility, i.e., the ratio of firm tangible assets to total assets. In specification (6), Firm COVID-19 exposure is 
interacted with Cross-listed, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s common shares are listed on one or more foreign 
stock exchanges in addition to the borrower’s domestic stock exchange, and zero otherwise. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.677*** 29.782*** 30.784*** 30.118*** 32.315*** 32.392*** 
 [3.262] [3.421] [3.286] [3.367] [3.700] [3.686] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 11.049** 10.641** 8.952** 11.821*** 9.457** 8.919** 
 [2.701] [2.500] [2.296] [2.886] [2.329] [2.399] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm size -3.016**      
 [-2.629]      
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm ROA  1.358     
  [1.399]     
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm leverage   0.002    
   [0.567]    
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm equity    -3.880***   
    [-3.230]   
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm tangibility     -0.195**  
     [-2.609]  
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Cross-listed      -83.217** 
      [-2.324] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 3,958 2,336 
Adj. R-squared 0.316 0.316 0.315 0.317 0.317 0.367 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 9. The role of institutional investors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method 
is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications include the interactions of the lender and borrower exposure measure with 
a number of different borrower’s country institutional investor characteristics. In specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-
19 exposure are interacted with Investor disclosure, i.e., the extent of disclosure intensity index in the borrower’s country. In specification 
(2), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Credit rights, i.e., the strength of credit rights index in the 
borrower’s country. In specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Legal contracts, i.e., 
strength of legal contracts index in the borrower’s country. In specification (4), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with High investor 
disclosure, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrower’s country Investor disclosure is in the top tercile of the sample, and zero if it 
is in the bottom tercile of the sample. In specification (5), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with High credit rights, i.e., a binary 
variable equal to one if the borrower’s country Credit rights is in the top tercile of the sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile of the 
sample. In specification (6), Firm COVID-19 exposure is interacted with High legal contracts, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the 
borrower’s country Legal contracts is in the top tercile of the sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile of the sample. The lower part of 
the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.911*** 32.252*** 30.938*** 31.559*** 66.135*** 69.768*** 
 [3.151] [4.216] [3.779] [3.328] [2.909] [5.364] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 9.519** 7.704** 7.147** 6.597* 33.280*** 13.226** 
 [2.404] [2.524] [2.041] [1.729] [3.553] [2.673] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Investor disclosure -13.756**      
 [-2.388]      
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Investor disclosure 1.699      
 [0.682]      
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Credit rights  -4.535**     
  [-2.182]     
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Credit rights  -3.287***     
  [-2.935]     
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Legal contracts   -6.784**    
   [-2.345]    
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Legal contracts   -2.827***    
   [-2.757]    
Bank COVID-19 exposure × High investor disclosure    -23.786*   
    [-1.899]   
Firm COVID-19 exposure × High investor disclosure    5.547   
    [1.014]   
Bank COVID-19 exposure × High credit rights     -35.363*  
     [-1.845]  
Firm COVID-19 exposure × High credit rights     -28.765***  
     [-3.019]  
Bank COVID-19 exposure × High legal contracts      -40.537*** 
      [-3.320] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure × High legal contracts      -7.162* 
      [-1.710] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,004 3,828 4,039 
Adj. R-squared 0.319 0.320 0.319 0.325 0.321 0.324 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 10. Lending relationships and subsidiary role 
This table reports estimated coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
A1. Estimation method used is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications include the interaction of lender and 
borrower exposure measures with lending relationship measures. In specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 
exposure are interacted with Relationship lending, i.e., a binary variable equal to 1 for a prior lending relationship between the lender 
and the borrower during the previous 3-year period, and zero otherwise. In specification (2), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm 
COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Relationship lending number, i.e., the ratio of the number of prior loans between the lender 
and the borrower during the previous 3-year period to the total number of loans received by the borrower during the same period. In 
specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Relationship lending amount, i.e., the 
ratio of the amount of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the previous 3-year period to the total amount of loans 
received by the borrower during the same period. In specification (4), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are 
interacted with Bank subsidiary, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the lender operates a subsidiary in the borrower’s country, and 
zero otherwise. In specification (5), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Firm subsidiary, i.e., 
a binary variable equal to one if the borrower operates a subsidiary in the lender’s country, and zero otherwise. The lower part of the 
table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 34.842*** 31.857*** 31.915*** 50.630* 31.092*** 
 [3.438] [3.337] [3.321] [1.711] [3.721] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 6.445 8.432** 8.328** 29.872** 7.267* 
 [1.595] [2.201] [2.177] [2.364] [1.947] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending -18.880**     
 [-2.565]     
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending 12.080     
 [1.422]     
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending number  -32.158**    
 
 [-2.662]    
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending number  -6.735    
  [-0.386]    
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending amount   -28.065**   
 
  [-2.334]   
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Relationship lending amount   -16.954   
   [-0.977]   
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank subsidiary    -23.280  
    [-0.744]  
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Bank subsidiary    -22.617*  
    [-1.882]  
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Firm subsidiary     -17.294 
     [-0.263] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Firm subsidiary     52.240 
     [1.545] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 3,565 3,931 
Adj. R-squared 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.323 0.322 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 11. The syndicate’s structure 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables 
are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different 
specifications include the interaction of lender and borrower exposure measures with measures of the 
syndicate’s structure. In specification (1), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure are 
interacted with Number of lenders. In specification (2), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 
exposure are interacted with Bank share. In specification (3), Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-
19 exposure are interacted with Syndicate Herfindahl. In specification (4), Bank COVID-19 exposure and 
Firm COVID-19 exposure are interacted with Syndicate Herfindahl adj, i.e., the Syndicate’s Herfindahl 
adjusted for the Bank COVID-19 exposure of the syndicate’s members. The lower part of the table denotes 
the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 37.175*** 32.438*** 32.443*** 
 [4.326] [3.583] [3.617] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 9.133** 9.250** 9.314** 
 [2.512] [2.601] [2.627] 
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Number of lenders 2.094*   
 [1.898]   
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Number of lenders 0.176   
 [0.345]   
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Bank share  -0.879**  
  [-2.198]  
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Bank share  -0.067  
  [-0.492]  
Bank COVID-19 exposure × Syndicate’s Herfindahl   -0.008** 
   [-2.215] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure × Syndicate’s Herfindahl   -0.001 
   [-0.421] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.317 0.316 0.316 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 









The first section includes the definitions of variables employed. The second section reports (i) 
estimates from specifications with different controls, (ii) results from alternative estimation 




Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 




B. Main explanatory variables: COVID-19 exposure 
Bank COVID-19 exposure The lender’s exposure to COVID-19. The calculation is based on the counting of 
word combinations referring to COVID-19 in quarterly earnings conference calls 
held by publicly listed companies. These transcripts are available from the 
Refinitiv Eikon database. The exposure is calculated by parsing the available 
earnings call transcripts and counting the number of times the synonyms associated 
with COVID-19 are used. Then this number is divided by the total number of words 
in the transcript to account for differences in transcript length. For a detailed 
definition of this procedure see Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2020). 




Lent, and Tahoun 
(2020) 
   
C. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Log of loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral A binary variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, and zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Performance provisions A binary variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, and 
zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
General covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Net covenants The number of net covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Loan type A series of binary variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of binary variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Bank share The bank’s share of the loan facility. DealScan 
Syndicate’s Herfindahl The Herfindahl index of the syndicate (a measure of the concentration of holdings 
within a syndicate). The Herfindahl index is calculated using each syndicate 
member’s share in the loan. It is the sum of the squared individual shares in the 
loan, and varies from zero to 10,000, with 10,000 being the Herfindahl when a 
lender holds 100% of the loan. 
DealScan 
Relationship lending A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 




Relationship lending number The ratio of the number of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 3-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total number 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period. 
DealScan 
 
Relationship lending amount The ratio of the amount of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower 
in the 3-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total amount 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period.  
DealScan 
 
   
D. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank ROA The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank capital The ratio of bank capital to total assets. Compustat 
Bank NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
Bank equity The ratio of bank equity to total assets. Compustat 
Lerner index The Lerner index of the bank, which equals (p-mc/p), where p is the average 





producing bank output (also at the bank-year). We proxy the lending rate from the 
ratio of interest income to total commercial loans and we estimate the marginal 
cost from the non-parametric estimation of a cost function. We provide more 
details at the end of this Appendix. 
Bank subsidiary A binary variable equal to one if the lender operates a subsidiary in the borrower’s 
country, otherwise zero. 
DealScan 
 
E. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
Firm size The log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm ROA The return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm leverage The firm debt to total assets ratio. Compustat 
Firm equity The log of firm equity capital. Compustat 
Firm tangibility The ratio of firm tangible assets to total assets. Compustat 
Firm debt  The firm debt to equity ratio. Compustat 
Firm retained earnings The ratio of firm retained earnings to total assets. Compustat 
Firm EBITDA The log of firm EBITDA. Compustat 
Firm cash The log of firm sales. Compustat 
Firm subsidiary A binary variable equal to one if the borrower operates a subsidiary in the lender’s 
country, otherwise zero. 
DealScan 
Cross-listed A binary variable equal to one if the firm’s common shares are listed on one or 
more foreign stock exchanges in addition to the firm’s domestic stock exchange, 
and zero otherwise.  
Compustat; 
firm disclosures 
   
F. Explanatory variables: Lender’s and borrower’s country characteristics 




GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s 
and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
GDP The difference in annual GDP (USD million) between the lender’s and the 
borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
Inflation The difference in annual inflation rate (%) between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. 
WDI 
   
G. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country institutional characteristics 
Investor disclosure The extent of disclosure intensity index (0-10) in the borrower’s country. The index 
is constructed according to the DB06-14 methodology. The variable High investor 
disclosure is the associated binary variable equal to one if Investor disclosure is in 
the top tercile of our sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile.  
FactSet 
Credit rights The strength of credit rights index in the borrower’s country. The index is 
constructed according to the DB05-14 methodology. The variable High credit 
rights is the associated binary variable equal to one if Credit rights is in the top 
tercile of our sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile. 
FactSet 
Legal contracts The strength of legal contracts index in the borrower’s country. The index is 
constructed according to the DB05-14 methodology. The variable High legal 
contracts is the associated binary variable equal to one if Legal contracts is in the 
top tercile of our sample, and zero if it is in the bottom tercile.  
FactSet 
   
H. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country institutional characteristics 
VIX The Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX Index). The VIX 
index measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500. 
Bloomberg; 
CBOE 
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Table A2. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Different specifications include different 
loan controls to show that the estimates on the term Bank COVID exposure are not overly sensitive to the loan controls 
used. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 28.487*** 31.743*** 29.220*** 26.827** 
 [2.822] [2.966] [3.309] [2.545] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 4.700 6.266* 8.460** 5.316* 
 [1.482] [1.936] [2.163] [1.695] 
Loan amount  -13.838***   
 
 [-7.597]   
Maturity  15.642***   
  [5.007]   
Collateral   58.361***  
   [10.038]  
Number of lenders   -1.307***  
   [-3.399]  
Performance provisions    -4.095*** 
    [-5.990] 
General covenants    -11.356*** 
    [-8.031] 
Bank size -271.576** -305.529*** -398.747*** -283.440** 
 [-2.531] [-2.748] [-3.335] [-2.477] 
Bank ROA 107.676*** 135.005*** 107.190** 105.401** 
 [3.048] [3.598] [2.503] [2.606] 
Bank capital -8.658 -14.637* -4.943 -4.860 
 [-0.908] [-1.930] [-0.604] [-0.474] 
Firm size -17.078*** -10.049*** -10.321*** -18.219*** 
 [-20.130] [-11.196] [-14.625] [-22.052] 
Firm ROA -3.287*** -2.670*** -2.868*** -3.254*** 
 [-15.044] [-13.079] [-12.740] [-15.793] 
Firm leverage 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 
 [8.823] [9.717] [7.382] [9.169] 
GDP growth  4.294 3.265 0.219 3.576 
 [0.874] [0.697] [0.049] [0.731] 
GDP per capita 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 [6.874] [6.773] [8.183] [6.402] 
Constant 4,213.225** 4,910.844*** 5,887.025*** 4,345.175** 
 [2.706] [3.106] [3.478] [2.618] 
Observations 4,327 4,316 4,128 4,327 
Adj. R-squared 0.185 0.215 0.288 0.209 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table A3. Seemingly unrelated regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
The estimation method is FGLS. Different specifications include a system of regression equations to control for the simultaneous 
determination of loan terms in each loan facility (only the estimates from the regression where the dependent variable is AISD 
are reported). In each regression, the set of regressors is the same as in the regression for AISD (including AISD and excluding 
the variable that acts as regressand in the respective equation). In specification (1), two regression equations are estimated, where 
the dependent variable is AISD and Bank COVID-19 exposure respectively. In specification (2), three regression equations are 
estimated, where the dependent variable is AISD, Bank COVID-19 exposure and Firm COVID-19 exposure respectively. In 
specification (3), four regression equations are estimated, where the dependent variable is AISD, Bank COVID-19 exposure, Firm 
COVID-19 exposure and Loan amount respectively. In specification (4), five regression equations are estimated, where the 
dependent variable is AISD, Bank COVID-19 exposure, Firm COVID-19 exposure, Loan amount and Maturity respectively. In 
specification (5), six regression equations are estimated, where the dependent variable is AISD, Bank COVID-19 exposure, Firm 
COVID-19 exposure, Loan amount, Maturity and Collateral respectively. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed 
effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 31.664*** 20.480*** 19.855*** 21.521*** 21.516*** 
 [7.990] [5.177] [5.019] [5.440] [5.439] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 6.824*** 17.329*** 17.699*** 18.828*** 18.210*** 
 [2.723] [6.941] [7.089] [7.542] [7.294] 
Loan amount -10.048*** -10.157*** -19.975*** -20.374*** -19.033*** 
 [-8.121] [-8.209] [-16.275] [-16.599] [-15.510] 
Maturity 8.903*** 10.183*** 12.983*** 20.294*** 12.307*** 
 [3.985] [4.559] [5.814] [9.101] [5.530] 
Collateral 56.327*** 56.196*** 54.938*** 53.278*** 97.491*** 
 [22.178] [22.127] [21.632] [20.980] [40.399] 
Number of lenders -0.609*** -0.554*** -0.296 -0.289 -0.414** 
 [-3.296] [-2.998] [-1.601] [-1.566] [-2.240] 
Performance provisions -0.532 -0.510 0.246 0.297 1.642** 
 [-0.765] [-0.733] [0.354] [0.428] [2.365] 
General covenants -11.882*** -11.887*** -11.891*** -12.163*** -12.187*** 
 [-9.750] [-9.755] [-9.758] [-9.981] [-10.001] 
Bank size -2.954* -3.163** -2.799* -2.686* -1.924 
 [-1.932] [-2.069] [-1.831] [-1.757] [-1.259] 
Bank ROA -11.993*** -12.547*** -12.450*** -12.813*** -6.591 
 [-2.722] [-2.848] [-2.826] [-2.908] [-1.497] 
Bank capital 0.376 0.437 0.573 0.489 0.190 
 [0.478] [0.555] [0.729] [0.622] [0.242] 
Firm size -8.415*** -8.429*** -4.901*** -4.118*** -2.218** 
 [-8.575] [-8.590] [-5.003] [-4.204] [-2.265] 
Firm ROA -2.613*** -2.593*** -2.203*** -2.191*** -1.938*** 
 [-11.587] [-11.495] [-9.772] [-9.716] [-8.599] 
Firm leverage 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 
 [6.944] [6.804] [6.942] [6.682] [5.419] 
GDP growth  -5.055*** -5.326*** -4.155** -4.152** -5.730*** 
 [-2.618] [-2.758] [-2.152] [-2.150] [-2.968] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [10.603] [10.398] [8.613] [8.941] [7.964] 
Constant 467.159*** 465.724*** 607.382*** 581.000*** 537.619*** 
 [15.387] [15.340] [20.061] [19.192] [17.765] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 
R-squared 0.302 0.303 0.292 0.288 0.244 
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Table A4. Results for AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISU and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered 
by bank. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. 








Bank COVID-19 exposure 1.917**  3.511** 
 [2.024]  [2.485] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure  1.251** 0.515 
 
 [2.635] [0.876] 
AISD 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 
 [17.666] [21.749] [20.986] 
Loan amount -0.170 -0.158 -0.038 
 [-0.562] [-0.720] [-0.183] 
Maturity 2.906*** 2.245*** 2.135*** 
 [4.956] [5.783] [6.008] 
Collateral 4.052*** 3.743*** 3.670*** 
 [8.397] [9.038] [8.527] 
Number of lenders -0.020 0.056* 0.029 
 [-0.495] [1.868] [1.006] 
Performance provisions 0.189 -0.033 -0.030 
 [1.334] [-0.390] [-0.331] 
General covenants 0.016 0.529*** 0.405** 
 [0.105] [2.779] [2.704] 
Bank size 1.378 23.658 3.384 
 [0.068] [1.151] [0.153] 
Bank ROA 16.589*** 0.603 12.617** 
 [3.185] [0.121] [2.342] 
Bank capital -1.138 1.680* -0.343 
 [-1.283] [1.802] [-0.348] 
Firm size -0.180 -0.269 -0.374* 
 [-0.959] [-1.418] [-1.989] 
Firm ROA 0.015 -0.074** -0.097*** 
 [0.411] [-2.411] [-3.391] 
Firm leverage 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [1.529] [0.617] [0.682] 
GDP growth  2.051** -1.038 -0.458 
 [2.113] [-1.628] [-0.844] 
GDP per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [3.743] [3.173] [2.858] 
Constant -25.579 -367.719 -59.132 
 [-0.090] [-1.250] [-0.188] 
Observations 2,484 2,391 2,168 
Adj. R-squared 0.605 0.629 0.652 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
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Table A5. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics [in brackets]. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification and the type of 
standard error clustering. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.836*** 30.836*** 30.836*** 30.836*** 30.836*** 
 [6.831] [4.361] [8.735] [5.476] [6.800] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 8.924** 8.924* 8.924** 8.924** 8.924** 
 [2.633] [1.693] [2.108] [2.339] [2.520] 
Loan amount -9.891*** -9.891*** -9.891*** -9.891*** -9.891*** 
 [-7.838] [-4.015] [-4.007] [-6.622] [-7.558] 
Maturity 7.714** 7.714 7.714 7.714** 7.714** 
 [2.647] [1.332] [1.538] [2.455] [2.748] 
Collateral 54.832*** 54.832*** 54.832*** 54.832*** 54.832*** 
 [7.081] [9.237] [6.971] [16.647] [7.142] 
Number of lenders -0.673 -0.673* -0.673* -0.673*** -0.673 
 [-1.307] [-1.653] [-1.977] [-2.870] [-1.312] 
Performance provisions -0.813*** -0.813 -0.813 -0.813 -0.813*** 
 [-4.485] [-0.704] [-1.110] [-1.404] [-3.471] 
General covenants -11.411*** -11.411*** -11.411*** -11.411*** -11.411*** 
 [-10.442] [-4.915] [-10.480] [-8.565] [-9.630] 
Bank size -397.289*** -397.289*** -397.289*** -397.289** -397.289*** 
 [-6.469] [-2.724] [-8.009] [-2.519] [-6.088] 
Bank ROA 131.013*** 131.013*** 131.013*** 131.013*** 131.013*** 
 [5.078] [3.283] [9.253] [3.008] [5.040] 
Bank capital -7.221 -7.221 -7.221* -7.221 -7.221 
 [-1.686] [-0.973] [-1.961] [-0.827] [-1.709] 
Firm size -8.515*** -8.515*** -8.515*** -8.515*** -8.515*** 
 [-6.841] [-3.407] [-3.901] [-5.595] [-6.807] 
Firm ROA -2.583*** -2.583*** -2.583*** -2.583*** -2.583*** 
 [-18.074] [-5.611] [-7.545] [-9.608] [-18.587] 
Firm leverage 0.030*** 0.030** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 [10.168] [2.549] [4.944] [4.046] [9.625] 
GDP growth  -1.781 -1.781 -1.781 -1.781 -1.781 
 [-0.392] [-0.247] [-0.355] [-0.406] [-0.376] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [5.381] [2.626] [2.689] [5.144] [5.759] 
Constant 6,031.291*** 6,031.291*** 6,031.291*** 6,031.291*** 6,031.291*** 
 [7.105] [2.892] [8.469] [2.675] [6.694] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Lender’s country Firm Borrower’s 
country Bank-firm pair Country-pair 
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Table A6. Weighted regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Each specification includes a different 
weight. In specification (1), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower to the total number 
of loans in our sample. In specification (2), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower’s 
country to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between the 
lender’s country and the borrower’s country to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (4), we weight 
by the number of loans between the borrower and the lender’s country to the total number of loans in our sample. The 
lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.032*** 30.819*** 31.093*** 30.573*** 
 [3.112] [3.307] [3.262] [3.429] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 9.516** 8.933** 8.887** 10.115** 
 [2.414] [2.318] [2.289] [2.581] 
Loan amount -8.750*** -9.868*** -9.834*** -9.317*** 
 [-6.026] [-7.441] [-7.440] [-6.596] 
Maturity 7.472*** 7.722*** 7.641*** 7.717*** 
 [2.990] [3.081] [3.078] [3.132] 
Collateral 53.875*** 54.782*** 54.650*** 52.574*** 
 [9.624] [10.320] [10.032] [9.219] 
Number of lenders -0.875** -0.680* -0.681* -1.017*** 
 [-2.580] [-1.764] [-1.821] [-2.966] 
Performance provisions -0.570 -0.821 -0.824 -0.538 
 [-1.045] [-1.377] [-1.384] [-0.943] 
General covenants -11.497*** -11.358*** -11.305*** -11.393*** 
 [-10.212] [-10.616] [-10.014] [-10.211] 
Bank size -393.753*** -391.487*** -399.555*** -412.362*** 
 [-2.838] [-3.022] [-3.033] [-3.254] 
Bank ROA 125.604*** 130.288*** 129.841*** 116.433*** 
 [3.062] [3.252] [3.207] [2.891] 
Bank capital -7.239 -6.343 -6.634 -4.536 
 [-0.990] [-0.841] [-0.937] [-0.600] 
Firm size -8.877*** -8.585*** -8.653*** -9.172*** 
 [-7.702] [-8.060] [-7.685] [-7.834] 
Firm ROA -2.505*** -2.578*** -2.579*** -2.505*** 
 [-12.387] [-12.792] [-12.681] [-12.071] 
Firm leverage 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 [8.670] [8.177] [8.383] [8.419] 
GDP growth  -1.856 -2.043 -2.190 -2.171 
 [-0.422] [-0.482] [-0.502] [-0.500] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [7.588] [7.284] [7.505] [7.866] 
Constant 5,963.251*** 5,937.899*** 6,059.854*** 6,208.628*** 
 [3.037] [3.239] [3.255] [3.466] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.317 0.315 0.315 0.319 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
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Table A7. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection 
model. The dependent variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method in Panel A is maximum likelihood and in Panel B it is OLS with standard 
errors clustered by bank. Specifications (1)-(3) of Panel A report the estimates from the first-stage probit 
model for the determinants of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part of Panel A denotes the 
dummy variables used in each specification. Panel B reports the estimates of the second-stage OLS 
regression for the effect of the lender and borrower exposure measures on loan spreads. Each of the 
specifications in Panel B includes the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) from the corresponding specification 
in Panel A. The lower part of Panel B denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 









Loan amount 0.068*** 0.039*** 0.034* 
 [6.336] [2.591] [1.749] 
Maturity -0.013 0.031 0.125*** 
 [-0.673] [1.135] [3.685] 
Collateral 0.084*** 0.207*** 0.118** 
 [3.021] [5.213] [2.377] 
Number of lenders -0.003 0.002 0.002 
 [-1.585] [0.806] [0.643] 
Performance provisions 0.076*** 0.161*** 0.182*** 
 [8.851] [10.991] [8.912] 
General covenants 0.212*** 0.283*** 0.326*** 
 [15.366] [12.331] [10.578] 
Firm size -0.105*** -0.061*** 0.027 
 [-13.072] [-5.517] [0.551] 
Firm ROA 0.009*** -0.004 -0.007* 
 [4.302] [-1.131] [-1.728] 
Firm leverage 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 [2.127] [4.653] [2.511] 
Firm equity   -0.047 
   [-0.919] 
Firm tangibility   -0.008*** 
   [-10.077] 
Bank size  0.089*** 0.067** 
  [3.734] [2.291] 
Bank ROA  0.766*** 0.339** 
  [16.111] [2.524] 
Bank capital  -0.034*** -0.028 
  [-3.652] [-1.317] 
Bank NPLs   -0.016 
   [-0.279] 
Firm loans   -363.796*** 
   [-6.027] 
Bank-firm loans   2,047.922*** 
   [2.668] 
Constant 776.014*** 337.945*** 460.804*** 
  [12.557] [3.652] [3.656] 
Observations 18,664 8,043 5,326 
Loan type and purpose dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 













Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.990*** 30.821*** 32.303*** 
 [3.314] [3.305] [3.174] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 8.843** 8.922** 10.176** 
 [2.304] [2.312] [2.643] 
Loan amount -9.256*** -9.809*** -8.204*** 
 [-7.098] [-7.449] [-6.242] 
Maturity 7.222*** 7.677*** 7.723*** 
 [3.009] [3.111] [3.208] 
Collateral 55.012*** 55.242*** 50.266*** 
 [10.062] [9.860] [9.910] 
Number of lenders -0.667* -0.659* -0.384 
 [-1.789] [-1.775] [-1.068] 
Performance provisions -0.252 -0.564 0.488 
 [-0.439] [-0.952] [0.851] 
General covenants -9.412*** -10.856*** -7.935*** 
 [-6.589] [-7.278] [-4.349] 
Bank size -396.003*** -396.576*** -377.429** 
 [-3.013] [-3.043] [-2.700] 
Bank ROA 127.453*** 131.871*** 141.106** 
 [3.135] [3.286] [2.492] 
Bank capital -6.530 -7.116 -10.437 
 [-0.899] [-0.980] [-1.194] 
Firm size -9.611*** -8.691*** -10.199*** 
 [-9.257] [-8.346] [-12.093] 
Firm ROA -2.463*** -2.578*** -2.616*** 
 [-12.200] [-12.656] [-14.421] 
Firm leverage 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 
 [8.616] [8.090] [8.701] 
GDP growth  -2.766 -2.013 -2.062 
 [-0.660] [-0.476] [-0.751] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [6.738] [7.108] [5.239] 
Lambda 12.775** 4.558 23.291*** 
 [2.537] [0.639] [3.651] 
Constant 5,988.470*** 6,015.287*** 5,730.724*** 
 [3.230] [3.268] [2.914] 
Observations 4,117 4,117 3,412 
Adj. R-squared 0.316 0.315 0.309 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
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Table A8. Different bank-, firm- and macro-controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Each specification includes a different set of firm- and macro-level 
controls. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank COVID-19 exposure 30.277*** 32.015*** 32.288*** 35.470*** 31.727*** 33.157** 
 [2.916] [3.592] [3.194] [3.345] [3.352] [2.412] 
Firm COVID-19 exposure 10.268** 8.655** 9.398** 8.304* 8.953** 5.777* 
 [2.665] [2.178] [2.292] [1.870] [2.360] [1.836] 
Bank size 139.410 -384.409*** -433.794*** -390.833** -414.864*** -332.133*** 
 [0.676] [-2.908] [-3.303] [-2.330] [-3.172] [-2.878] 
Bank ROA 187.589*** 141.220*** 136.307*** 166.548*** 131.276*** 109.874** 
 [4.020] [3.206] [3.311] [3.539] [3.308] [2.570] 
Bank capital -3.421 -8.638 -8.922 -11.270 -6.797 -3.738 
 [-0.374] [-1.147] [-1.142] [-1.284] [-0.933] [-0.523] 
Firm size -9.745*** -1.089 -7.904*** -22.105*** -9.039*** -8.589*** 
 [-11.389] [-0.459] [-7.006] [-4.348] [-8.405] [-7.883] 
Firm ROA -2.630*** -2.346*** -2.374*** -3.746*** -2.583*** -2.580*** 
 [-13.579] [-12.785] [-8.808] [-6.912] [-12.959] [-12.404] 
Firm leverage 0.031*** 0.014** 0.009** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 [8.100] [2.733] [2.336] [8.246] [8.384] [8.229] 
GDP growth  -0.955 -2.078 -1.098 -1.054 -4.937 -1.299 
 [-0.339] [-0.470] [-0.253] [-0.229] [-1.304] [-0.294] 
GDP per capita 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [5.877] [7.435] [7.764] [4.768] [6.787] [7.422] 
Bank NPLs -152.498      
 [-1.057]      
Bank equity -30.343*      
 [-1.979]      
Firm equity  -8.177**     
  [-2.602]     
Firm tangibility  0.261***     
  [5.000]     
Firm debt   0.592***    
   [5.381]    
Firm retained earnings   -169.988    
   [-0.367]    
Firm sales    -0.674   
    [-0.638]   
Firm EBITDA    15.342***   
    [3.020]   
GDP     0.000***  
     [3.458]  
Inflation     0.000  
     [1.458]  
VIX      1.020* 
      [1.885] 
Constant -1,397.900 5,868.755*** 6,570.023*** 6,016.423** 6,059.854*** 5,057.086*** 
 [-0.478] [3.140] [3.530] [2.554] [3.255] [3.124] 
Observations 3,557 3,958 4,033 3,814 4,117 4,117 
Adj. R-squared 0.310 0.317 0.320 0.308 0.315 0.316 
Loan controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
 
